The Chapel Hill Expert Survey Dataset

The Chapel Hill Expert Survey provides expert estimates for party positions for European parties and has been conducted since 1999. It is run by Gary Marks, Marco Steenbergen, Ryan Bakker, Liesbet Hooge, Seth Jolly, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny and Milada Vachudova. The name of the survey derives from the university of the researchers that have founded the survey. Regular waves of the survey were conducted in 1999, 2002, 2006, 2014, 2017 and 2019. Since then, there were two additional waves specific to Covid-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As this last survey is both recent (2023) and includes many of the basic ideological questions, we will use the Ukraine dataset for this overview. The survey provides researchers with expert ratings of political parties on key ideological positions as well as salience. The dataset can be accessed here. We present the dataset below, with tables and figures appearing in the panel on the right. While reading, please keep in mind the questions you see below and answer them once you reached the end. In the final panel, we provide a link to a platform with an interactive version of the dataset and additional tasks.

Table 1: General Tasks for the Dataset

Tasks
How well do the party families described in chapter 9 map onto the European ideological space?
Which party families appear to be more ideologically unified and which more dispersed?
What kind of relationship exists between left-right position and support for the EU and why?
Looking at the extreme parties in Europe, are they more defined by the cultural or the economic dimension?

Dataset Description

Overall Information

As an example, Table 2 shows a part of the 2023 dataset with some of the parties coded in Germany and Greece. The dataset also provides their seat share and vote share at the last election before the survey. The parties are also coded into party families (more on this later) and have an indicator whether they are in government or not. Please note that some of these questions might not be available for all waves of the survey.

Table 2: General Information in the CHES dataset

	country	party	family	vote	seatperc	govt
24	Germany	CDU	christdem	18.90	20.65	0
25	Germany	SPD	socialist	25.70	27.99	1
26	Germany	FDP	liberal	11.50	12.50	1
27	Germany	Grunen	green	14.80	16.03	1
28	Germany	PDS; Linkspartei; Linke	rad left	4.90	5.30	0
29	Germany	CSU	christdem	6.20	6.11	0
30	Germany	AfD	TAN	10.30	11.28	0
31	Greece	PASOK	socialist	11.46	13.67	0
32	Greece	ND	cons	40.79	48.67	1
33	Greece	SYN; SYRIZA	rad left	20.07	23.67	0
34	Greece	KKE	rad left	7.23	8.67	0
35	Greece	XA	TAN	0.00	0.00	0
36	Greece	EL	TAN	4.45	5.33	0

EU positions

Table 3 show mean estimates of the expert ratings for the EU positions for the German parties in the dataset. The question is worded: “overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration in 2019”. A higher number (on the 1 to 7 scale) means a strong pro-European position. In Germany, the CDU, SPD and the Greens are strongly pro-EU, while the FDP are more neutral. Meanwhile, the AfD and Linke are strongly critical towards the EU.

Table 3: EU positions in the CHES dataset

	party	country	eu_position
24	CDU	Germany	6.00000
25	SPD	Germany	6.00000
26	FDP	Germany	5.45455
27	Grunen	Germany	6.90909
28	PDS; Linkspartei; Linke	Germany	2.72727
29	CSU	Germany	5.45455
30	AfD	Germany	1.72727

Ideological positions

Table 4 shows the major ideological positions included in the dataset. Two ideological scales that are included in the dataset are the economical as well as the cultural left-right scale. The economic-related scale is called “lrecon” and it ranges from 0 (“Extreme left”) to 10 (“Extreme right”). In Germany we can see that the AfD is much less extreme relative to the other parties on economic issues, while the Left is clearly differentiated from the Greens. Older datasets also provide measures of how clear the economic position is (lrecon_clear) and how salient that area is for the party (lrecon_salience). Additionally, the dataset provides a scale for cultural ideology called “galtan”. This scale ranges from 0 (“Libertarian/Postmaterialist” or GAL) to 10 (“Traditional/Authoritarian” or TAN). These two scales illustrate te special position of the FDP in the German party system, as the FDP is on the left and positioned close to the SPD, Left and Greens on the GALTAN scale, but far away from them on the economic scale.

Table 4: Ideological positions in the CHES dataset

	country	party	lrecon	galtan
24	Germany	CDU	6.727270	6.00000
25	Germany	SPD	3.909090	3.27273
26	Germany	FDP	8.090910	2.45455
27	Germany	Grunen	3.363640	1.09091
28	Germany	PDS; Linkspartei; Linke	0.909091	2.72727
29	Germany	CSU	7.636360	7.18182
30	Germany	AfD	6.000000	9.36364

Additional Information

Finally, many waves of the CHES dataset provide additional, more specific policy questions, for example on multiculturalism, immigration and populism. In the Ukraine survey, there is a question on the salience of anti-elite discourse, which is a measure for populism in the party, an example of which is shown in Table 5. These positions differ in each wave of the survey, but provide a very important data source for the study of parties in Europe.

Table 5: Specific policy positions in the CHES dataset

	country	party	antielite_salience
24	Germany	CDU	1.272730
25	Germany	SPD	0.818182
26	Germany	FDP	1.090910
27	Germany	Grunen	1.000000
28	Germany	PDS; Linkspartei; Linke	6.727270
29	Germany	CSU	2.636360
30	Germany	AfD	9.454550

Country Coverage of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey

Figure 1 shows the countries included in each previous iteration of the dataset. Some countries (such as Germany and Spain) have been included in all iterations of the dataset. Others have been added over time, such as countries that joined the EU at a later date, as well as non-EU countries Turkey, Norway and Switzerland. The survey in 2017 was run as a “flash survey”, therefore not covering all countries. The results from 1999 to 2019 are available as a trend file, facilitating the analysis of paty positions over time. The standard data format is a stata (or csv) file that shows the aggregated means for each party. The team also provides an expert-level dataset that shows each expert’s individual coding (for example in order to identify parties on which the experts disagreed).

The parties in the CHES dataset

Figure 2 shows all parties in the CHES dataset in 2023. On the x-axis, we plotted their economic position (called lrecon in the CHES dataset), ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). Parties on the left campaign for government involvement in the economy and regulation, often to better fund the welfare state. Parties on the right campaign for less government involvement, a more free market oriented economic policy and a leaner welfare state. On the y-axis, we plotted the “galtan” dimension of the CHES dataset, representing the cultural ideological dimension. Again, a value of 0 represents the extreme left, while a value of 10 represents the extreme right. Parties on the left are called “libertarian” or “postmaterialist” and campaign on issues such as personal freedoms, civil rights and democractic participation. Parties on the right are described as “traditional” or “authoritarian” and campaign on social order, upholding traditions and morals.

We can also see that while there seem to be more parties along the diagonal axis (being either on the left in both economic and cultural terms), there are a number of parties located in the opposite quadrants, namely parties that are economically right, but culturally left, or vice versa. We can also see that there is considerable overlap between the party families. We will take a closer look at these families in subsequent plots. According to the codebook of the CHES dataset, “family attribution is based primarily on Derksen classification (now incorporated in Wikipedia), triangulated by a) membership or affiliation with EP party families b) Parlgov classifications and c) self-identification”. The CHES team also points out that it “endeavor[s] to carefully classify all parties; however, some parties are easier to categorize than others. For instance, some parties fit into two or more categories (e.g., Lega Nord can be classified as Radical Right and Regionalist). CHES users are advised to review family codings to ensure they match their own research goals.” One additional way to classify parties is using the European Parliament group they joined. Not all waves have the family variable in the dataset.

Relationship between Left-Right Ideology and EU Positions

Figure 3a shows the parties in the 2023 dataset plotted according to their economic left-right position as well as their position on European integration. The form of the distribution follows (with some exceptions) the shape of an inverted U: Many parties on the extreme left and right are much less supportive of the European Union than those in the centre. However, we should note that there are many parties especially on the left in the socialist and green party families that support EU integration. The Christian Democratic and conservative party family seems to be strongly divided, with parties such as Fidesz and the UK Conservatives being opposed to EU integration while parties such as the Partido Popular in Spain and the Moderates in Sweden supporting EU integration. Figure 3b plots the same relationship for the cultural (GALTAN) dimension.

Conservative Parties

Figure 4 shows the family of conservative parties, which have played an important role in European politics over the last 100 years. Conservative Parties arose in the historic era of the industrial revolution and the class cleavage it brought up. Conservative parties traditionally represented capital owners and business. They are often positioned on the political right. Consequently, their origin lies in an economic cleavage and not in a cultural one. Consequently, we can find some conservative parties that show a right position on the economic scale, but a centrist position on the cultural dimension. Meanwhile, there are also some examples of conservative parties that have adopted a centrist position on economic issues (such as Fidesz in Hungary).

Figure 4 also shows the conservative parties from the four countries that chapter 9 focuses on: The Conservative Party in the United Kingdom, the Partido Popular in Spain and the Confederation Liberty and Independence in Poland.

Christian-Democratic and Confessional Parties

Figure 5 shows the Christian-Democratic parties in Europe in 2019, including the Christian Democratic Union, the Christian Social Union of Bavaria (both Germany) and the Civic Platform (Poland) as examples from chapter 9. While these parties are explicitely formed around the church-state cleavage, they occupy a similar party space as the conservative party in terms of ideology. Christian-Democratic parties tend to be both economically and culturally on the right, but they often root their programmatic stances more explicitly in religion than conservative parties. While their traditional voting groups have been religious, they have taken on the role of the major centre-right party in many countries, most notably Germany in which the CDU/CSU has held power since 2005.

Liberal Parties

Figure 6 shows the liberal party family. Liberal parties predominantly occupy the bottom right quadrant of the graph, holding right-wing economic (limited state involvement in the economy, limited welfare states), but left-wing cultural views (protection of civil rights and freedoms). These parties have played an important role in European politics, partly due to their special position in the party space that makes them suitable coalition partners for parties on both the left and right. In Spain, the Citizens (C’s) have played an important role in the coalition negotiations in the late 2010s. The German FDP has been a coaltiion partner for both CDU and SPD in German history, but brought down coalition negotiations between the CDU and Greens after the 2017 election. The Liberal Democrats in the UK have been in coalition with the Conservatives, but have been major critics of the Conservative party during the Brexit process. Modern (Nowoczesna) is a Polish party formed in the 2010s that combine their liberal position with a pro-European platform. However, the liberal party family spreads across the political centre, with some liberal parties adopting left-wing economic positions.

Socialist Parties

Figure 7 shows the socialist party family. Similar to the liberal party family, socialist parties originate in the class cleavage, but represent the interest of the working class. Consequently, socialist parties occupy the left of the economic scale, stressing redistribution and a strong welfare state. Additionally, many socialist parties run on culturally left platforms. Figure 7 also shows the major socialist parties that make up the left in the UK (Labour), Germany (Social Democratic Party) and Spain (Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party). While the majority of socialist parties occupy the lower-left quadrant of the party space shown in Figure 7, some parties classified as socialist also hold more right-wing economic or cultural positions.

Radical Parties

Figure 8 shows both radical left and right parties. While radical left parties are mainly defined by an economic left position with a strong emphasis on redistribution and involvement of the state in the economy, radical right parties are predominantly defined by a right-wing position on the cultural dimension, stressing traditional values and upholding the social order. Radical right parties have gained a lot of electoral support in recent years, with some, such as the Law and Justice Party in Poland (PiS) evolving into the largest party in Poland. Meanwhile, the UK Independence Party, later the Brexit party and now Reform UK was instrumental in Britain’s exit from the EU and the Alternative for Germany has been a major challenge to the German party system as has Vox in Spain. Radical left parties include several established communist and socialist parties such as the United Left in Spain (IU) and the Left in Germany, as well as new parties such as Razem in Poland. As we saw in Figure 8.1, many of these parties also do not support European integration, albeit for different reasons: While radical right parties oppose migration and aim to defend national sovereignty, many radical left parties reject the EU as a neoliberal project.

Green, Regionalist and Agrarian Parties

Finally, Figure 9 shows the green, regionalist and agrarian party families. Green parties occupy a similar ideological space as socialist parties, with left-wing positions on both the cultural as well as the economic dimension. However, their platforms play specifically on the environmental issue, with the Green party in Germany ascending to one of the largest parties in German politics. Meanwhile, agrarian parties are specifically representing rural interests. One example of these parties is the PSL in Poland. However, these parties play a diminished role in European politics today. Finally, regionalist parties originate in the centre-periphery cleavage and stress the representation of regional interests against national parties. These parties are especially strong in the UK (with SNP and Plaid Cymru winning seats in the House of Commons) and Spain (with the Catalan and Basque regional parties supporting many minority governments).

Speed CHES Covid-19 and Ukraine

In the years 2020, the project conducted a smaller expert survey on the issues of Covid-19. Both the Covid-19 survey as well as the Ukraine survey presented above ask specific questions about these two issues. Through the CHES IDs, these variables can be easily connected to other datasets.

Covid-19

Figure 10 shows the positions of parties in Germany, Denmark, and Belgium on two dimensions of the Covid-19 pandemic: On the x-axis, the researchers asked for “the party’s position on responding to the COVID-19 crisis since it emerged in 2020?” with a low value indicating “Prioritizing keeping the economy open” and a high value indicating “Prioritizing containing the virus”. On the y-axis, we plot the rating for “the party’s position on whether scientific expertise is essential for public policymaking” with a low value indicating “Scientific expertise is not essential for sound policymaking” and a high value “Scientific expertise is essential for sound policymaking”.

Ukraine

Figure 11 shows the relationship between economic left-right position and support for delivering weapons to Ukraine. Parties on the extreme left and right are less likely to support delivering weapons.

In Figure 12, we pool the measures for supporting delivering weapons as well as taking in refugees from Ukraine on the level of the party family (this variable is included in the Ukraine CHES dataset). Radical left parties are most likely to not support delivering weapons, while radical right parties don’t support taking in refugees.

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